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Globalization and Urban Social Action 
in Metro Manila 
Ton van Naerssen 
This contribution argues that specific features of urban struggles at the 
local level are the result of the interaction between local and global 
forces. Policies aim at shaping Metro Manila as an industrializing, 
"global" city in the East Asian region. Large infrastructure work 
that affects the urban poor is on the urban development agenda. The 
current global discourse on urban development policy also stresses gov- 
ernance and participation of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and 
community-based organizations (CBOs). These trends impact on urban 
social action in Metro Manila. In contrast to the 1970s, when the urban 
movement and the state were strongly opposed to each other, after the 
downfall of Marcos, the dominant tendency was to cooperate with the 
agencies of the state while maintaining a "critical distance." Some time 
in the 1990s, the urban social movement disappeared. Ironically, this oc- 
curred at the same time that the Urban Development and Housing Act 
(UDHA), meant to protect the rights of the urban poor, was passed in 
1996. It remains to be seen whether the problems of the urban poor can 
be solved under the existing system. 
KEYWORDS: globalization, governance, urban social movement, urban 
poor, Metm Manila 
Around three billion people, or half of the world's population, live in 
cities today, and their numbers are increasing rapidly. Since no popula- 
tion increase is expected in the countryside, it is estimated that within a 
few years, the urban population will exceed the rural population. The 
growth of the urban population will mainly take place in developing 
countries. Only fifteen years ago, around one billion people lived in the 
cities of the South; today, this number has doubled. In the coming 
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decades, more than 95 percent of the increase in urban population wrll 
occur in cities of the South, registering an absolute growth of more 
than two billion. Thus, by the year 2025, four billion people will be 
living in these cities (UNHCS 1996). 
Much has been written about the problems accompanying rapid 
urban growth, such as the spread of squatter settlements and urban 
poverty, deterioration of the physical infrastructure, and increase in 
violence. Naturally, it is the poor in particular who suffer from the 
worsening conditions in the cities. Yet in spite of the many problems 
they face, the poor perceive the city as an environment that offers 
opportunities to pursue their strategies in coping with poverty. Contrary 
to analyses based on ideas of the "culture of poverty" (Lewis 1965), 
many among the poor are not merely passive recipients of urban 
problems. The past decades have demonstrated in several countries, 
especially in the South, that community-based organizations (CBOs) of 
the urban poor and supportive nongovernment organizations (NGOs) 
have been actively involved in improving the urban environment. In 
some countries, they form umbrella organizations or networks, thus 
bringing urban social movements into existence at some periods of 
time. 
Castells' (1983) definition that an urban social movement should 
change the meaning of the city has its merits. I opt, however, for a 
more restricted version, where a network of urban CBOs and NGOs 
aims to obtain access to land and collective goods and services (such as 
clean water, sanitation, and healthcare) for the urban poor. The efforts 
of urban social movements usually contain a dimension of protest and 
contention, which may embrace different forms. A network is called a 
social movement if it is capable of mobhzing people for petitions, 
mass meetings, and demonstrations to support the issue at stake. World- 
wide, the urban struggle mainly revolves around four issues: (1) obtain- 
ing titles to land, (2) improvement of collective services, (3) forced 
upgrading of poor settlements, and (4) demolition and eviction 
without compensation. As these issues indcate, an urban social move- 
ment is a geographically relevant actor since it is constantly searching 
for ways to change the urban geographical environment. In turn, the 
urban environment in the broad sense of the word, encompassing 
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physical, economic, demographic, sociocultural, and political dimensions, 
exerts a slgmficant influence on the way the actor proceeds. 
A core political question is whether the urban movement wdl be co- 
opted into the sociopolitical system, or whether it will develop as a 
countervahg power against the existing power structure. Participants in 
an urban movement are confronted with the permanent dilemma of 
whether or  not, and to what degree, to cooperate with government 
agencies. The question of the q h t  strategy cannot be answered with 
the help of abstract theories. There are always changes in the political 
conditions of cities, regons, and countries that require new responses 
and a rethinkmg of strateges by urban communities. It is the particular 
political situation, fixed at a specific point in space and time, which 
offers constraints and opportunities for collective action. Actors in the 
urban movement must always be aware of the political opportunity 
structure (Assies 1997). 
In thts contribution, which focuses on Metro Manila, I will elaborate on 
the question of changing strategies. I will look at the connection be- 
tween urban struggles at the local level and policy trends at the global 
level, since the specific features of any urban social movement are the 
result of the interaction between local and global forces. In Metro 
Manila, like in other large urban agglomerations in Asia, the rate of 
population growth substantially surpasses the growth of the national 
population. In around 1960, Metro M a d a  accounted for 2.5 d o n  
inhabitants, whlle current estimates vary between 10 and 12 million. 
Nearly one in seven inhabitants of the Philippines and 30 percent of the 
country's urban population live in Metro Man& (wwwcensus.gov.ph/data, 
January 2004; The Manika Times, 20 October 2003). Each year, the natu- 
ral increase of around 100,000 persons is matched by the arrival of the 
same number of w a n t s ,  who join the urban poor in the metropolis. 
Globalization and the New 
Urban Policy Model 
Today's globahation is characterized by the mobhty of capital. World 
capital competes for markets and continuously searches for new pro- 
duction locations. Finance capital, in particular, moves around the globe 
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at great speed and in incredibly large amounts Rapid change is characteristic 
of the global, postmodern society, and cities are drawn into an ongoing 
process of restructuring to adapt to the changmg requirements of capital 
(Castells 1996; Sassen 2001). In this process, some cities lose compara- 
tive economic advantages, whde others gain (Duffj 1995). 
Since the economies of the South are strongly influenced by the 
world economy, restructuring also occurs in its cities. In the past, the 
economies of major cities were shaped by their function as regional or 
national centers of commerce, government, education, or manufactur- 
ing. The manufacturing industry was aimed at the national market and 
was intended to substitute for imports; hence, the import-substitution 
industry. Alongside this formal economy, an extensive informal sec- 
tor came into existence. In this sector, many of the urban poor fmd 
employment as contract workers in small-scale industries or construc- 
tion, or are self-employed in street trading, services, and transport. The 
existence of an extensive informal sector, where jobs are insecure and 
poorly paid, has since become a characteristic feature of most cities of 
the South. 
Current globalization forces the large cities of the South to offer 
modern infrastructure and communication fachties, cheap labor, and tax 
incentives in order to attract foreign capital and to develop export in- 
dustry. East Asian cities, such as Singapore, Bangkok, Jakarta, Seoul, and 
Shanghai, are outstanding examples of such policies. In these cities, the 
export industry has contributed substantially to high economic growth 
rates (especially during the years before the regon's crisis in 1997-1998), 
and it is a major source of employment, too. Export-oriented policies 
have led to changes in the labor market. Due to low wages, a new, 
female urban working class has emerged, as well as a middle class of 
certain affluence. 
These cities are global cities as much as their counterparts in the 
North and, usually substantially stronger than those in the North, they 
demonstrate that wide income disparities and exclusionary processes are 
the dark sides of global postmodernism. Since they are part of a 
global system, they are drawn into the current global discourse on urban 
development policy, which focuses on good governance. In turn, good 
governance stresses interaction and cooperation among the several 
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sectors of society. Limiting the role of the national state in setting 
economic policy fits into the neoliberal agenda. Thus, there are three 
major groups of actors in the development process: the state with 
its government agencies, the private business sector, and the NGOs and 
CBOs, both representing "civil society." If there are commercially 
attractive opportunities, the private sector wdl get a chance whde civil 
society will take responsibllity for public services and other nonprofit 
activities. Thus, the function of the state ideally is to enable the two 
sectors to fulfill their theoretical roles and, in doing so, the three wdl 
cooperate in the planning and implementation of urban programs and 
projects. The application of h s  model in the cities of the South creates 
a greater scope for poor communities to be involved in urban devel- 
opment processes and to initiate interventions to improve their situation. 
Therefore, community participation, which comprises both the organi- 
zation of the poor in urban communities and the facllitation of their 
access to decision-mahg institutions, is another key notion in current 
urban development policy. The more poor communities are organized, 
the better they can take part in efforts of government agencies to im- 
prove the urban environment. In this way, benefits for the poorer seg- 
ments of the population can be improved in matters such as physical 
infrastructure, public services, urban violence, and housing. More- 
over, community participation is one of the most effective ways of 
reducing social exclusion, a major feature of urban poverty (Abbott 
1996; Cheema 1993; UNDP 1997). 
Proponents of urban governance and community participation in 
developing countries seem to forget, however, that the application of 
these principles requires certain preconditions. A major precondition is 
a government that enables participatory processes to occur at the 
community level, even if these may result in a critical attitude toward gov- 
ernment policies or agencies. In other words, the organizational capacity 
of urban CBOs and community participation depends on the demo- 
cratic character of local and national governments. It is the government 
that shapes the political environment in which the development and 
actions of independent CBOs and supportive NGOs can be encouraged. 
Bottom-up processes are difficult to introduce in a political climate 
where democracy is absent or still in its infancy. By definition, authori- 
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tarian regimes do not enable communities to organize themselves. 
Instead, such regimes aim to control urban poor neighborhoods. In 
such societies, participatory processes, if they occur, are mostly used as 
instruments for implementing goals predefined by the authorities. The 
authoritarian character of many governments in developing countries is 
one of the major factors that prevent poor communities from becom- 
ing actively involved in improving their situation. 
Another factor is the prevailrng social system in developing countries, 
whlch for the outsider is often hidden behind formal democratic struc- 
tures, such as political parties, elections, and laws protecting the poor 
(van Naerssen, Lighthart, and Zapanta 1996). Storey (1999, drawing on 
Grindle 1980) uses the term "neopatrirnonial state" to refer to situa- 
tions in which bureaucracies are weak and the state neglects the needs 
of the urban poor: 
As a mechanism of and for the elite, the state acts both as a 
means for personal position and gain and ensures, through patron- 
age ties, the subordination and disempowerment of dependent 
clients. (Storey 1999, 285) 
He continues: 
Although altered by time and circumstance and the ways in which 
successive presidents have exploited it, the patron-client system has 
been and remains the fundamental political order in the Philippines. 
(Storey 1999, 285) 
The core of today's global ideological forces consists of a neoliberal 
drive toward liberalization and privatization of the economy, but 
coupled with a sociopolitical agenda that stresses institutional transpar- 
ency, governance, and participation. Intergovernment organizations, such 
as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), and international NGOs are actively involved in promoting 
these notions. The latter, in particular, offer support to locally organized 
CBOs and NGOs. Charitable NGOs, lrke PLAN International and Foster 
Parents, are usually nonpolitical. International NGOs such as Brot fiir 
den Welt, Denchurch, and Oxfam come closer to the ideas of partici- 
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pation and empowerment of CBOs. They are interconnected and fund 
projects all over the world, and thus are able to exert a substantial in- 
fluence. The globalization of grassroots politics (Smith 1995) is a phe- 
nomenon that should not be underestimated. It also constitutes an 
important force contributing to changes in urban development policies. 
The Modernization of Metro Manila 
Traditionally, the government structure of Metro Manila had consisted 
of several independent local governments (cities and municipalities) that 
distributed economic and political interests in the metropolitan area 
among several competing clans. The system changed under President 
Marcos (1965-1986). Confronted by strong opposition and a newly 
established Communist Party of the Phdippines (CPP), which started a 
guerrilla war in the countryside, Marcos proclaimed martial law in 1972. 
He was then able to centralize Philippine policy and to create a central 
Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC), with his wife, Imelda 
Marcos, as governor and general manager. 
Some years later, the metropolis came under the Ministry of Hu- 
man Settlements (MHS), also with Imelda as its head. The Ministry was 
given extensive powers and the nght to interfere in most planning and 
decision-making activities concerning public services. President Marcos 
wanted to achieve industriahation and economic growth by shifting 
from import substitution to export orientation. The aim was for Metro 
Manila to attract multinational corporations, so the city had to be mod- 
ernized and priority given to large infrastructure projects The World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (I* supported Marcos's efforts. 
In 1976, the MMC issued a comprehensive plan for the physical and 
socioeconomic development of the metropolis, "Manila: Towards the 
City of Man." In the public investment program, the center of gravity 
shifted to infrastructure. The plan aimed at the construction of an 
export-processing zone, a new port, and an improved road system 
(including an inner urban hlghway, the Epifanio de 10s Santos Avenue 
PDSA], and the Manila North Diversion Road). Building prestigious 
government centers, international hotels, and luxury residences on 
reclaimed land at the Bay of Ma& was also part of the plan. During 
the period 1973-1981, the World Bank lent USQ62.5 billion to the 
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Philippines to support these urban development schemes (Bello, Ktnley, 
and E h s o n  1982). 
After the People Power Revolution of February 1986, which led to 
the fall of Marcos, President Aquino (1986-1992) came to power. 
Democracy was restored, which unfortunately also meant the reappear- 
ance of old political clans on the political scene. Nevertheless, with free 
elections and a free press, more "democratic space" was created and 
the idea of governance gained importance. More specifically, the Local 
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which. is widely considered as 
Aquino's most important piece of legislation, was instrumental in imple- 
menting this idea. Under the LGC, substantial authority is devolved to 
local governments; the local authorities are given the power to design 
their own organizational structures, and CBOs and NGOs are allowed to 
elect representatives to defend their interests in local government bodies. 
Since the time of the Aquino admitllsttation, civil society has substan- 
tially gained importance, too. In 1987, the right of independent organi- 
zations to participate in decision-making at all levels was included in 
the new Philippine Constitution. Aquino's successor, Ramos (1992- 
1998), accepted this principle of participation as legitimate in the dls- 
course among government officials, the educated middle class, and social 
activists (Carroll 1999). Since then, there is a general agreement that 
NGOs, CBOs, and other people's organizations (POs), being the major 
actors in civd society, have had more scope for influencing policy and 
action than elsewhere in Southeast Asia (Clarke 1998). Estimates of the 
number of NGOs, for example, vary between 15,000 and 18,000. 
To a substantial degree, the plans for combating the central problems 
of Metro Manila have remained the same, however. The major objec- 
tive is to attract foreign investment and export-oriented industries. This 
objective has been strengthened, in the sense that more attention is being 
paid to the liberalization of trade and industry. President Ramos ex- 
pressed h s  vision for the country in the plan "Phdippines 2000.'' This 
plan also formed the basis of the economic policy of h s  successor, 
President Estrada (1998-2001), wMe the current president, Macapagal- 
Arroyo, maintains the neoliberal agenda for development. The ultimate 
aim is that the Philippines should become an industrialized, capitalist 
country that is firmly integrated into the global economy. 
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It is clear that, being the national "growth pole," Metro Manila ful- 
fds  an important role in thts vision. For this reason, priority is being 
given to large infrastructure work, such as radial roads, new land rec- 
lamations, and a huge industrial area south of the metropolis. The 
metropolis must be recreated and reinvented as a global city in the East 
Asian region. 
Accordmg to Jejomar Binay, former Chairman of the Metropolitan 
Manila Development Authority @hOA): 
I envision Metro Manila evolving into a humane, world-class me- 
tropolis known for its livability, and socio-cultural exuberance. It shall 
be the center of a growth polygon, whtch will influence the creation 
of socio-economic opportunities for areas beyond its political 
boundaries . . . As a global-oriented metropolis, Metro Manila shall 
evolve into a major business and transactions center in the Asia- 
Pacific Region. (www.mrnda.gov.ph/vision.htm, April 2003) 
Corporate land developers have received this message and, with that 
perspective, are busy budding luxury "gated cities," such as Bonifacio 
Global City, Eastwood Cyber City, and Bay City (van den Muijzenberg 
and van Naerssen n.d.). But what can be said about the squatter areas 
and the urban poor? 
The Origins of the Urban Social Movement 
Contrary to other cities in Southeast Asia and s d a r  to some cities in 
Latin America, Metro Manila has experienced an active urban move- 
ment. After the Second World War, thousands of families fled from 
the devastated countryside to Manda and, settttng on available vacant 
spaces, became urban squatters. The main strategy of the government 
in dealing with the squatter problem had been eviction and relocation 
to sites outside the capital. Site provisions, however, were minimal, and 
urban jobs as well as community fachties were scarce. Thus, many set- 
tlers abandoned the relocation sites, unable to maintain the payments 
for whatever lots they had been allowed to buy. 
During the Marcos period, h s  policy continued, but new legislation 
was introduced and the forms of intervention were different. The 
urban poor were considered as a pool of cheap labor for export 
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industries as well as a potential source of unrest. Therefore, part of the 
"City of Man" plan was to clear the metropolis of its squatter popu- 
lation. To Imelda Marcos, squatters were "land grabbers and eyesores" 
and an obstacle to the realization of her dream of  a modern 
metropolis. In 1975, squatting was declared a criminal offense under 
Presidential Decree 772, an important tool for clearing the city. A fine 
or imprisonment rangmg from six months to one year was the punish- 
ment for squatting. 
Thls is not to say that low-cost housing was not on the agenda. One 
of the major programs undertaken by the National Housing Authority 
was the Tondo Foreshore Plan, which had a decisive impact on the 
evolution of the urban movement in Metro Manila. Tondo Foreshore 
Land, reclaimed before the Second World War, was squatted by mi- 
grants immedately after the war. In the 1960s, Tondo was considered 
to be the largest slum area in Southeast Asia, with an estimated popu- 
lation of 175,000. When Marcos unfolded his vision to modernize 
Metro Manila, the origmal intention to create an industrial port area in 
Tondo was revived. The World Bank supported the plan with loans. 
However, it was in Tondo that Philippine urban community organiz- 
ing got its start. With the support of the Philippine Ecumenical 
Committee for Community Organizing (PECCO), twenty community 
organizations established ZOTO (Zone One Temporary Organization), 
an umbrella organization that aimed to improve living conditions 
through self-help projects and to make demands on city authorities. 
ZOTO was based on the ideas of community organizer Saul Alinsky. 
Accordmg to these ideas, poor people will experience collective power 
by confronting outside organizations and agencies on concrete cornmu- 
nity issues, such as land rights and community services. Community 
workers were also guided by principles such as "autonomy" of the 
neighborhood and decision-mahng by residents. I refer to the ap- 
proach of the CBOs and N W s  concerned as the temtonal orientation of 
the urban movement, since local needs are at the core of their activities 
(van Naerssen 1989). 
In 1975, ZOTO formed Ugnayan, a federation covering the whole 
of Tondo Foreshore Land. As an alternative to relocation to distant 
sites, it proposed "upgrading" or on-site improvement. A series of 
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mass protests staged by ZOTO/Ugnayan succeeded in changing the 
orignal plans of the World Bank. The Bank decided to reserve one 
part of Tondo for housing, while occupants who had to move were 
offered a lot in a nearby area. No security of land tenure was offered, 
however, and the price that had to be paid for legal land titles was 
high. For this reason, ZOTO/Ugnayan continued to pressure the World 
Bank and the government. In due course, ZOTO became more and 
more politicized. Its strategy changed from territorial to political, since 
it aimed at structural changes in the political environment to improve 
the situation of the urban poor rather than focus on their daily needs. 
For some years, ZOTO/Ugnayan was the only social organization to 
challenge the Marcos regune under martial law. It even expanded, with 
the creation of a larger federation of fifty communities spread all over 
Metro Mada.  Large-scale arrests, however, followed the Habitat [;on- 
ference in Vancouver in 1976, where Ugnayan presented a "People's 
Decree." On the occasion of the conference, a large demonstration was 
staged in M a d a  that resulted in the arrest of no less than 2,000 partici- 
pants. Savage repression followed, and it seemed as if the urban 
movement had been destroyed for good. 
In 1982, a renewed and determined effort at slum clearance and 
relocation occurred. Imelda Marcos proclaimed a "last campaign" and 
ordered the immediate removal of squatter f a d e s .  Organizations of 
urban poor were subsequently revived. In July 1982, an alliance of 
squatter federations was created, c a h g  itself the Afiance of the Poor 
against Demolition (ALMA). Its primary goal was to resist slum clear- 
ance, using a political instead of a territorial approach. For example, it 
charged the regime of using development loans from IMF and the 
World Bank to finance demolitions, with the ultimate objective of 
making way for U.S. investors. 
Decline of the Urban Social Movement 
The role of the urban social movement in the People Power Revolu- 
tion of February 1986 is unclear, although one can assume that the 
parts of the urban social movement not affhated with the National 
Democratic Front (NDF) supported the revolt. Soon after the change in 
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regune, a new umbrella organization of the urban poor came into ex- 
istence. It did not live long and soon gave way under the dilemma of 
whether or not to cooperate with the new government. President 
Aquino established a special Presidential Commission on the Urban 
Poor (PCUP), leading to certain expectations by some CBOs and NGOs. 
They wanted to use the "democratic space" to put urban land reform on 
the agenda. Other CBOs and NGOs were co-opted by the new gov- 
ernment agencies. The fact was that both the territorial and the politi- 
cally oriented organizations wanted to preserve the character of protest 
movement. For the politically oriented organizations, resistance to urban 
development policies was std l  an instrument for political mobilization 
against capitalist development strategies. 
This is not the place to deal with the many activities and initiatives 
undertaken by the actors of civil society in those years (see, however, 
Berner 1997 and I<araos 1993). I d h t  myself to some main h e s .  
The PCUP was an advisory committee with minor influence on a weak 
president. Its major success was the establishment of a large relocation 
project in Quezon City that ended in confusion. The Commission had 
no further mandates. It was largely dependent on local governments, 
which had the authority to decide on matters of land use, and it had 
to stand by helplessly and observe how the ruthless demolitions, as in 
those under the Marcos regme, continued. According to a study by 
the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights, there were 276 evictions in 
Metro Manda during Aquino's presidency, involving 600,000 urban poor. 
In 90 percent of the cases, no effort was made to relocate people or 
give any compensation (Murphy 1993). In two years (1993-1994) dur- 
ing the Ramos administration, 80 demolitions took place, involving 
around 80,000 people. In that sense, not much had changed. 
However, one cannot deny that the political context was different 
from that under the Marcos regune. Notwithstanding all the failures, the 
corruption, and the appahng contrasts between rich and poor, many 
people from the middle and lower classes appreciated the increased 
democratic space. The NDF, and in particular the CPP, underestimated 
thls support for the institutions of formal democracy. The NDF started 
with a boycott of the 1986 snap elections, a strategic mistake, as the 
logic of that decision marginalized them during the People Power 
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Revolution. The party then failed in its efforts to devise an appealing 
strategy to cope with the new political situation. 
Although it became clear that urban policy had not changed much 
during and after the Aquino period, some optimism about the pros- 
pects for a radical urban movement existed among progressive political 
parties and groups. Then the CPP split into two wings. The "Reaffirm" 
wing returned to the old Maoist positions, whle the "Reject" wing re- 
jected the old strategy and wanted to renew itself. The debate between 
the two wings paralyzed the NDF for many years, and had its effects 
on the urban social movement as well. The debate centered on the is- 
sue of the democratization of the CPP (Rocamora 1994), but the sig- 
nificance of an urban movement was also at stake. While the orthodox 
Reaffam wing considered the struggle in the cities as subordinate to the 
struggle in the countryside, the other wing valued the urban struggle 
more hghly. In thls respect, it is slpficant that the strongly urbanized 
region of Mada-Rizal belonged to the Reject group. In the meantime, 
international NGOs and donor agencies became aware of the political 
implications of supporting specific groups within civil society. They 
abstained from interfering in the party struggle but generally favored 
new CBOs and NGOs not affiated with the CPP. As Carroll notes: 
purely local issues such as demolitions in one or another neighbor- 
hood are being transcended . . . in favor of broader sectoral con- 
cerns but without the ideological apparatus that in the past proved 
decisive. . . . Allies such as . . . church leaders, members of aca- 
deme, sympathetic members of the bureaucracy, congressional staff- 
ers, and foreign NGOs have become even more crucial-and in the 
interaction among these groups one can at times sense the develop- 
ment of a real civil society transcendmg sectoral and class concerns. 
(Carroll 1999, 131) 
The urban movement in Manila became characterized by a wide 
spectrum of CBOs and NGOs, consisting of both radical-political and 
reformist groups. The reformists set the tone. One of their successes is 
the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA), which was passed 
in 1996, after six years of advocacy and lobbying with members of 
Congress (Karaos, Gatpatan, and Hotz 1995). The UDHA sets out the 
rights of the urban poor regardmg evictions and relocations. Also, af- 
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ter intensive lobbying by civil society groups, President Ramos withdrew 
the notorious Presidential Decree 772 mentioned above. NGOs looked 
for new ways to improve the living conditions of the urban poor. 
Among others, extensive experiments were undertaken with the Com- 
munity Mortgage Program (CW), a unique program of social housing 
to be carried out through community organizations in urban poor 
settlements. However, like its predecessors (the upgrading policy and the 
sites and services programs), the CMP generally reached the better-off 
among the poor. Moreover, it proved that the rights of the urban 
poor existed largely on paper only. The local governments of Metro 
Manila often dld not implement the UDHA and, in the many urban poor 
neighborhoods that lacked active CBOs, the poor were, in fact, with- 
out rights. In the meantime, the urban social movement faded away. 
The administration of President Estrada brought a brief period of 
policy return to sites and services schemes, which were realized chaoti- 
cally but strengthened the image of the president as a supporter of the 
poor. The large Pasig River rehabhtation program, which is carried out 
in cooperation with NGOs, has had its effects on many squatter fami- 
lies. In both cases, discussions and actions "from below" were h t e d .  
Some actors of civil society have definitely succeeded in using the 
opportunities offered by the change in political clunate since the Marcos 
period. These opportunities, however, are h t e d .  This is demonstrated 
by the continuing demolitions and evictions, affecting tens of thousands 
of families each year. In a number of neighborhoods, CBOs, NGOs, 
and POs cooperate and succeed in obtaining land titles or in improv- 
ing the level of collective services. However, while some thousands of 
families are supported with great effort, the number of urban poor in 
M a d a  increases by tens of thousands of f a d e s  each year. Seen from 
this perspective, much has yet to be done. 
Conclusion 
In the foregoing sections, I described some changing strateges of the 
urban social movement in Manila. Naturally, the movement consisted 
of groups of various orientations. Whichever orientation ultimately 
dominated depended on the political clunate. In contrast to the 1970s, 
when the movement and the state were strongly opposed to each 
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other, after the downfall of Marcos, the dominant tendency was to 
cooperate with the agencies of the state whde maintaining a critical &s- 
tance ("critical cooperation"). Some time in the 1990s, however, active 
"bottom-up" support for a metropolitan-wide movement faded away. 
Ironically, this occurred at around the same time that Congress ap- 
proved the UDHA. It remains to be seen whether the problems of the 
urban poor can be solved under the existing system. As long as great 
social inequalities exist in Metro Ma&, the potential for a radcal urban 
movement will remain. Thus, the struggle for structural changes in so- 
ciety might gain momentum sooner or later. The question is when and 
under what kind of political clunate a radcal movement d arise, and 
who the major actors wdl be. 
Globahation forms the backdrop of the urban struggle in Mada. 
It is neither the sole nor the major explanation for the existence of an 
urban movement, but the movement has to be considered as a 
response to modernization w i t h  the confines of the global economy, 
currently governed by neoliberal ideas. More directly, globalization is 
also noticeable in the interaction between international NGOs and actors 
of Phrlippine civil society. This topic, however, is an area for further 
research and discussion. 
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